The UK government has embarked on an ambitious programme to reform the English and Welsh probation sector. Key to these reforms has been 'marketisation'
Faced with a similar picture in 2010, the intention of the previous Coalition Government (2010 Government ( -2015 as set out in it's Coalition Agreement was as follows: "We will introduce a 'rehabilitation revolution' that will pay independent providers to reduce reoffending, paid for by the savings this new approach will generate within the criminal justice system." (HM Government 2010: 23) The Coalition Government's preferred strategy for reducing re-offending while also reducing costs was a combination of market testing, commissioning strategies that focus on payment by results and a diversification of the supplier base (Bannister et al. 2016) . The intention was to create a 'rehabilitation revolution' with payment by results a key driver of change (HM Government 2010) . Broadly speaking, this policy has continued under the administration of Prime Minister David Cameron (2015 -2016) and Prime Minister Theresa May (2016 -present) with one significant addition: a stronger focus on justice devolution. This paper first describes the evolution of current policy on Transforming Rehabilitation. It then describes the use of marketization and payment by results, assessing the evidence for their effectiveness. It finishes by discussing the potential of such policy levers to deliver innovation in the delivery of criminal justice.
Evolution of the Transforming Rehabilitation policy
In 2010 probation services in England and Wales were delivered by 35 Probation Trusts. Probation Trusts were consistent with a broader trend in public service reform under the previous New Labour which saw the creation of numerous 'armslength' mechanisms for the management of state services, such as Foundation Trusts in the health sector and Academy schools in education (Diamond 2013) .
Under the Coalition Government, early ideas on reform of the probation service envisaged a number of probation innovation pilot projects subject to payment by results and devolution of the commissioning of community offender services to the 35 Probation Trusts. The aim was to encourage new market entrants from the voluntary, private and public sectors as well as joint ventures, social enterprises and Public Service Mutuals (Ministry of Justice 2012). Probation Trusts would continue to deliver services to high-risk offenders and could compete to run other services.
This devolved strategy seemed consistent with the earlier Green Paper on criminal justice reform in which the Coalition Government set out an agenda designed to challenge a 'Whitehall knows best' approach, which was viewed as having stifled innovation at national and local levels (Ministry of Justice 2010). The Green Paper made repeated references to innovation encompassing the opportunities that reform would provide for criminal justice "frontline professionals" to innovate in their work with offenders (Ministry of Justice 2010: 11) and also the opportunities for a wide range of organisations to innovate within a mixed economy. Innovation seemed to include contributions from social entrepreneurs in local communities:
"Rather than operating under close central control, we want to unlock the professionalism, innovation and passion of experts from all walks of life who want to make their streets safer and their towns and cities better places in which to live." (Ministry of Justice, 2010: 9) However, a change of Secretary of State midway through the Coalition Government resulted in these approaches being discontinued (Bannister et al. 2016) (National Audit Office, 2015) , and as a mechanism to focus attention on preventative measures .
Third, PbR was seen as a means to transfer risk by making some or all of the payment to a service contingent on that service delivering agreed outcomes. Given the need to reduce public sector spending, the transference of risk and the deferment of payment for services were attractive propositions for the Coalition (Fox and Albertson, 2012) . Fourth, the PbR model was seen as a way of encouraging new market entrants, eliding with the Coalition's commitment to increase the proportion of specific public services delivered by independent providers (both private and not-for-profit), harnessing their 'creativity and expertise' (Ministry of It is too early to know how effective PbR has been as a driver of change in the English and Welsh criminal justice system. At the time of writing, because of the lag in calculating re-offending rates, re-offending rates for the first year of CRC operation were not available. However, a recent National Audit Office (2015) review found lack clear evidence that they delivered the potential benefits their supporters advocated, and cautioned that without such evidence, "commissioners may be using PbR in circumstances to which it is ill-suited, with a consequent negative impact on value for money" (National Audit Office, 2015: 8). (2010) to attempt to reduce the reoffending of three cohorts of 1,000 adult males who would be discharged from HMP Peterborough having served sentences of less than 12 months in custody. The outcome measure was a binary one of whether offenders were reconvicted or not (Disley et al. 2011: iv) . Disley et al. (2011) report that investors 2 raised £5m to fund the rehabilitation work and that they could earn a return of up to £8m from the government and the Big Lottery Fund if re-offending falls by 10 per cent per cohort, or, if the rate of re-offending for all 3,000 offenders falls by at least 7.5 per cent. If a reduction in re-offending beyond 7.5 per cent was delivered investors would receive an increasing return capped at 13 per cent over an eight year period (Social Finance 2011:3). Conversely, if offending did not fall investors would potentially lose all their money. Changes in national criminal justice policy led to the HMP Peterborough SIB being curtailed after two cohorts.
The independent evaluation of the SIB matched 936 offenders released from Peterborough (the first cohort) with 9,360 released from other prisons. The analysis found an 8.39 percent reduction in reoffending rates within the first cohort, which was insufficient to trigger payment for the first cohort (Jolliffe and Hedderman 2014) . Based on this reduction the Ministry of Justice (2014b.: 2) reported: 'This means that the provider is on track to achieve the 7.5% reduction target for the final payment based on an aggregate of both cohorts". However, interim analysis of the second cohort has thrown doubt on this prediction. A Ministry of Justice (2015) statistical bulletin provides early analysis of the progress of the second cohort.
Although only convictions within six months of release, rather than the usual 12 months, are reported, the results are disappointing and cast doubt on whether a 7 payment will be made at the end of the second cohort. There was only a small reduction in the frequency of reoffending -an average of 84 reconviction events per 100 offenders compared to a national rate of 86. Allen argues that, in general, JR has two key elements. First, it seeks to develop measures and policies to "improve the prospects not just of individual cases but of particular places" (Allen 2007: 5) . Secondly, JR adopts a strategic approach to the prevention of offending and re-offending by collecting and analysing data to inform commissioning decisions (ibid.). The Justice Reinvestment movement started in the US at around the turn of the new millennium with analysis identifying 'million dollar blocks': certain communities where states were spending up to a million dollars per block to "cycle residents back and forth from prison each year" (Cadora 2007 : 11, Allen 2007 . Early Justice Reinvestment projects explored whether some of this million-dollars per block might be better spent on other criminal justice or, ideally, broader social justice interventions, "to invest in public safety by reallocating justice dollars to refinance education, housing, healthcare, and jobs." (ibid.). Latterly, argue Fox et al. (2013) Justice Reinvestment has tended to shed its more radical 8 aspirations to deliver social justice and instead focus more narrowly on system 'reengineering', in process losing perhaps the characteristics of a movement for social innovation.
The Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot which was run by the Ministry of Justice from 2011 to 2013 had at its heart a local financial incentives approach to reward a successful reduction in demand on the criminal justice system (Wong et al 2013) . It was piloted in six sites: Greater Manchester (an urban conurbation comprising ten local authorities with a combined population of 2.69 million according to the UK Office of National Statistics) and five individual London boroughs. The aim of the pilot was to reduce demand on the criminal justice. The total cost of demand at each site was calculated by multiplying agreed demand metrics by prices for each metric agreed prior to commencement of the pilot and held at the same level for both years (Ministry of Justice 2013c). The Justice Reinvestment pilots represent a clear intention to decentralise and empower local delivery agencies. However, the system of metrics and payment regimes established by the Ministry of Justice have been critiqued as overly complex and providing insufficient incentive to encourage local agencies to invest or to make substantial changes to practice that were not already being planned (Wong et al., 2013) At the time of writing the full implications of this are not known but they would address one criticism of the original Transforming Rehabilitation policy: namely that contracts to run CRCs were commissioned by central government.
Discussion: Do marketization and decentralisation encourage innovation?
A common theme in the reforms described above is to create incentives for innovation in the delivery of offender rehabilitation services such that 'more is delivered for less'.
Innovation can take many forms. The use of payment by results in TR is a form of financial innovation in the funding of public services with the potential to provide access to new capital and to incentivize providers to develop innovative solutions to intractable social problems (National Audit Office 2015, Fox and Albertson 2012) . It is too early to say whether PbR has achieved its aims in the English and Welsh probation sector. However, looking at the wider experience of PbR in UK public service reform the limited evidence available suggests caution. The National Audit Office (2015) having reviewed available evidence was sceptical of the potential for PbR to stimulate innovation: "[W]e found expert opinion differs on the extent to which usingPbR promotes innovation. Government has typically used PbR to tackle difficultsocial problems that lack ready solutions -such as reducing reoffending. Some commissioners hope PbR will give providers the freedom to innovate, which might lead to new, long-term solutions to intractable problems. However, some providers told us that, given the risks associated with it, PbR is best suited to issues to which there are known solutions and where the commissioner's overarching aim is to reduce costs; they indicated that PbR is unlikely to encourage innovation because exploring new approaches is costly and increases the provider's risk. This suggests that where commissioners want innovation, providers are likely to expect additional financial incentive." (National Audit Office 2015: 21) The National Audit Office supported this statement with evidence from the major UK PbR schemes that they reviewed in preparing their report.
Innovation can take other forms. As Fox and Grimm (2015) (2013) argued that while local and community justice can enable an innovative and responsive local justice framework within which criminal justice practitioners regain discretion and are able to design more balanced, creative, and potentially more effective solutions, the marketization trend in TR was unlikely to be conducive to local and community justice. Also central to social innovation is the utlilisation of non-financial, social resources to achieve important social goals, but TR involved a payment by results model that has generally favoured large, private sector organisations able to make the long-term financial commitments required.
Only one CRC is led by a consortium in which the main contractor or 'prime' is a notfor-profit organisation. Social innovations often emerge bottom-up from front-line service delivery staff, service users or communities (Murray et al. 2010 ). Yet employee-led mutuals or staff Community Interest Companies were part of only 7 out of 21 winning bids to run CRCs.
However, other elements of TR seem more promising for creating an environment conducive to social innovation.  Recent Justice Devolution agreements hold out the potential for local government and local communities to become more involved in designing and commissioning justice services.
As the reform process develops it will be interesting to see whether different forms of innovation, particularly social innovations find a 'space' in the complex commissioning landscape that has been created.
